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New Frontiers in Ground, Essence, and Modality: Introduction 
Donnchadh Ó Conaill (Université de Fribourg) 
Tuomas Tahko (University of Bristol) 
 
 
Ground, essence, and modality seem to have something to do with each other. Can we 
provide unified foundations for ground and essence, or should we treat each as primitives? 
Can modality be grounded in essence, or should essence be expressed in terms of modality? 
Does grounding entail necessitation? Are the notions of ground and essence univocal? This 
volume focuses on the links – or lack thereof – between these three notions, as well as the 
foundations of ground, essence, and modality more generally, bringing together work on the 
metaphysics, epistemology, and logic of these three notions by some of the leading figures in 
the field as well as emerging young scholars. 
The invited contributors to this volume presented their work at a conference on 
Ground, Essence, and Modality at the University of Helsinki in June 2016, funded by the 
Academy of Finland Project The Epistemology of Metaphysics: From Rationalism to 
Nominalism. This conference is just one of many recent high-profile events and publications 
on these themes (e.g., the edited volumes Correia & Schnieder 2012a; Sirkel & Tahko 2014; 
Jago 2016).  
After providing a brief historical summary of the (re)emergence of modality, essence 
and ground as central notions in metaphysics (Section 1), we shall outline some of the main 
themes in recent work on these notions and on the links between them (section 2). In section 
3 we briefly introduce the papers in this volume. 
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1. Historical background 
The story of modality in the last century is a familiar one. For several decades modal 
discourse was shunned as suspiciously intensional or lacking empirical bona fides. Pioneering 
work by Saul Kripke and Ruth Barcan Marcus on quantified modal logic (e.g., Kripke 1963, 
Marcus 1967) reintroduced modality to philosophically polite society. The 1970s and 1980s 
saw a tide of work both on and using modality, with debates on the nature of possible worlds 
(Plantinga 1974; Lewis 1986), de re modal claims (Kripke 1980), natural kind terms and 
semantic externalism (Putnam 1975), characterisations of physicalism and rival positions in 
the philosophy of mind (Davidson 1970), and moral realism and rival positions in metaethics 
(Railton 1986). 
 Impressive though this body of work was, doubts began to surface as to whether 
modal notions were capable of delivering all that had been promised on their behalf. One set 
of doubts concerned the explanatory role which had fallen to a specific modal notion, 
supervenience. Jaegwon Kim suggested:  
 
Supervenience itself is not an explanatory relation. It is not a ‘deep’ 
metaphysical relation; rather, it is a ‘surface’ relation that reports a pattern 
of property covariation, suggesting the presence of an interesting 
dependency relation that might explain it (1993, 167). 
 
Similarly, Terry Horgan wrote “The moral is not that supervenience cannot be an important 
part of a broadly materialistic metaphysics, but rather this: putative supervenience relations 
that are themselves unexplainable and sui generis cannot play such a role” (1993, 565-566). 
What is needed, he continued, is a notion of “ontological supervenience that is robustly 
explainable in a materialistically explainable way” (op. cit., 566). 
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 These observations can be seen as clearing the way for the introduction of specifically 
explanatory notions, ones which do not just report modal co-variation between, e.g., 
phenomenal and physical facts or moral and non-moral properties, but which are apt to 
explain these co-variations. The notion which has proved by far the most popular is that of 
metaphysical ground (or grounding). This is frequently introduced with reference to 
explanatory questions (Schaffer 2009, 375; Raven 2015, 323) or purported non-causal 
explanations (Rosen 2010, 110-111; Audi 2012, 689-690). Indeed, ground is sometimes 
introduced as suitable to answer questions for which modal notions cannot suffice (e.g., 
Rosen 2010, 114; Fine 2012, 38, 41-42).1 
 Other doubts about modal notions began to surface around the same time. Some of 
these were also couched as requests for explanation which modal notions could not deliver. 
E. J. Lowe noted that the intuitive notion of ontological dependence was explanatory and not 
just modal:  
 
there is a strong intuition that […] Socrates’s life is the truly dependent 
entity here, while Socrates is a wholly independent existent (a substance). 
We want to say that Socrates’s life only exists because Socrates does, 
whereas it would be putting the cart before the horse to say that Socrates 
exists because his life does (1994, 39). 
 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed historical overview of ground see Correia & Schnieder 2012b, § 2. In 
what follows we shall treat ground as a relation which holds between facts, though there are 
conceptions of ground which treat it as holding between non-factual entities (e.g., Schaffer 
2009). 
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Loweʼs own suggestion to meet this explanatory demand was to appeal to identity 
dependence, where  
 
To say that the identity of x depends on the identity of y - or, more briefly, 
that x depends for its identity upon y - is just to say that which thing of its 
kind x is is [logically or metaphysically] fixed (at least partially) by which 
thing of its kind y is (op. cit., 41). 
 
The notion of identity which is to be determined here is not that of mere self-identity (indeed, 
it is difficult to see how the identity of any entity x with itself could be determined in any 
substantive sense, either by some other relation x bears to itself or by any relation x bears to 
any other entity y). Rather, what is to be determined is identity in the sense of there being a 
fact of the matter as to which entity of its type x is. For instance, there is a fact of the matter 
as to which event is the assassination of Julius Caesar, a fact which is determined in part by 
the identity of the person assassinated (see also Tahko & Lowe 2015, § 4.2). 
A substantive notion of identity was further exploited in work by Kit Fine. The modal 
renaissance of the late twentieth century had made much of essential properties, typically 
understood in terms of de re modal properties (Marcus 1967; Kripke 1980). In a series of 
papers beginning with the classic ʻEssence and Modalityʼ, Fine challenged this understanding 
of essence. Fine introduced a battery of familiar examples, all of which can be seen as 
supporting the following conclusion: 
 
any essentialist attribution will give rise to a necessary truth […] However, 
the resulting necessary truth is not necessary simpliciter. For it is true in 
virtue of the identity of the objects in question; the necessity has its source 
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in those objects which are the subject of the underlying essentialist claim 
(1994, 8-9). 
 
The notion of ʻidentityʼ to which Fine appeals is not the same as Loweʼs. Indeed, it is 
not entirely clear what he means by this term, particularly since he denies that the operator ʻit 
is true in virtue of the identity of xʼ can be analysed “into the notions of the identity of an 
object and of a proposition being true in virtue of the identity of an object” (1995a, 273). 
Rather,  
 
The notation should be taken to indicate an unanalyzed relation between an 
object and a proposition. Thus we should understand the identity or being 
of the object in terms of the propositions rendered true by its identity rather 
than the other way round (op. cit.; see also 1995b, 69 n2). 
 
Methodologically, this feels like putting the cart before the horse. Consider Fineʼs most 
famous example, that of Socrates and his singleton set. According to a modal criterion of 
essence, Socrates essentially belongs to his singleton: 
 
But, intuitively, this is not so. It is no part of the essence of Socrates to 
belong to the singleton. […] There is nothing in the nature of a person, if I 
may put it this way, which demands that he belongs to this or that set or 
which demands, given that the person exists, that there even be any sets 
(1994, 4-5). 
 
For this example to be convincing, we must surely understand the essence or nature of 
Socrates independently of understanding the proposition which we are evaluating (e.g., the 
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proposition that Socrates essentially belongs to his singleton). And the same presumably goes 
for any proposition which is supposedly true in virtue of the identity or being of Socrates. 
Indeed, it looks as though we can only understand some proposition as true in virtue of the 
identity of Socrates by having some prior understanding of his identity, thus turning Fineʼs 
suggested procedure on its head. 
 Nevertheless, Fineʼs basic point has been widely accepted: there is a notion of 
essence, that of the being or identity of an object or objects, which cannot be captured in 
purely modal terms. Indeed, Fine suggests that  
 
far from viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical necessity, we 
should view metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence. […] The 
metaphysically necessary truths can […] be identified with the propositions 
which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatsoever (1994, 9). 
 
At the turn of century, modality had regained a central place in metaphysics and 
undergone thirty years of sustained work. Partly as a result of this work and partly as a result 
of its perceived limitations, two non-modal notions stood ready to be developed: essence and 
metaphysical ground. Each was in some sense more fine-grained than modal notions, each 
was connected with projects of explaining modal truths, and each promised new advances 
across a range of philosophical disciplines. 
 
2. Recent themes 
Work on modality has continued apace in the early years of the twenty-first century, while 
essence and ground have each developed flourishing research programmes of their own. In 
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this section we shall briefly sketch some of the main themes informing work on each of these 
notions, paying special attention to work on the links between them. 
 One recent theme in work on modality has been the development of new metaphysical 
theories of modality, which offer alternatives to the well-established models of possible 
worlds. For instance, the “new actualists” seek to account for modality without also having to 
account for possible worlds (Vetter 2011, 742). Two versions of new actualism have been 
particularly prominent. Dispositionalism seeks to locate metaphysical modality in the 
dispositional properties of actually existing entities (Borghini & Williams 2008; Jacobs 2010; 
Vetter 2015). Essentialism, developing a suggestion which as we saw was made in Fine 1994, 
seeks to locate metaphysical modality in the essences of actually existing entities (Oderberg 
2007; Jubien 2009; Lowe 2012a; Hale 2013).2 Essentialism in this sense is thus one of main 
ways in which the notion of essence has been developed; we shall consider some others 
presently.  
 Another major theme in work on modality concerns our knowledge of what is 
metaphysically possible or necessary. The traditionally dominant view held that this 
knowledge is a priori: for instance, conceivability (see, e.g., the papers in Gendler & 
Hawthorne 2002) and intuition (Bealer 2000) have been put forward as ways of knowing 
modal truths. More recently there has been increasing interest in a posteriori ways of coming 
to know modal truths (see Fischer & Leon 2017). These approaches are collectively known as 
modal empiricism, as against the more traditional modal rationalism. By and large, modal 
                                                 
2 It is also worth noting that essentialism and dispositionalism can both be expressed in terms 
of what grounds metaphysical modality. For example, Lowe suggests that “a metaphysically 
necessary truth is a truth which is either an essential truth or else a truth that obtains in virtue 
of the essences of two or more distinct things. On this account, all metaphysical necessity 
(and by the same token all metaphysical possibility) is grounded in essence” (2012a, 939). 
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empiricism tends to be somewhat skeptical about ‘extraordinary’ modal truths, that is, modal 
truths that are not ordinary in the sense that we would commonly make them outside 
philosophy (or science) (compare van Inwagen 1998). These will likely include at least 
claims about what is nomologically impossible but metaphysically possible. 
 As mentioned above, a flourishing research programme seeks to find the metaphysical 
source of modality in essences. However, there have also been critical responses both to this 
programme and to Fineʼs original suggestion that essence cannot be reduced to modality. In 
particular, it has been argued that Fineʼs examples, such as that of Socrates and his singleton, 
can be understood as modal truths provided that suitable adjustments or restrictions are made 
to the latter (see, e.g., Zalta 2006; Correia 2012; Cowling 2013; Wildman 2013; for criticism 
see Skiles 2015). 
 The broadly Finean notion of essence (and related notions such as Loweʼs identity 
dependence) has been put to work in various areas of philosophy, such as the following: in 
characterizing and critically discussing ontic structural realism (Wolff 2012; French 2014, 
McKenzie 2014; Ó Conaill 2014) and mathematical structuralism (Linnebo 2008); in 
arguments against priority monism (Lowe 2012b; Tallant 2015); and in discussions of 
revelation, the thesis that we can come to know the essence of phenomenal properties by 
attending to our own experiences (Goff 2015; Trogdon 2017). One of the most prominent 
applications of essence has been in the literature on ground. A number of theorists have 
suggested that for grounding to occur, there must be an essential connection between the 
grounded fact and its grounds (Rosen 2010; Audi 2012; Ó Conaill 2018). Other theorists have 
considered the possibility of explaining or even reducing ground to essential connections 
(Correia 2013; Fine 2015).      
The literature on ground has seen more work on its formal features than has been the 
case with recent literature on essence. The standard view is that ground is an irreflexive, 
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asymmetric and transitive relation, but each component of this view has been questioned or 
denied.3 For instance, all three of these formal features have been denied by Gonzalo 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015); for a defence of all three see Raven 2013. Further challenges have 
been raised to irreflexivity (Jenkins 2011), transitivity (Schaffer 2012; Tahko 2013), and 
asymmetry (Thompson 2016). 
A closely-related issue is whether chains of grounds must be well-founded. There has 
been some debate in the literature as to how this notion should be understood, but a recent 
consensus has begun to form around the view that for a grounding chain to be well-founded is 
for every grounded fact in the chain to be fully grounded by facts which themselves do not 
require any grounds (see Dixon 2016, 446; Rabin & Rabern 2016, 366; for a related claim see 
Litland 2016). Early work on ground tended to assume without much argument that chains of 
ground must be well-founded (e.g., Schaffer 2010, 37), but this assumption has come under 
increasing criticism (Bliss 2013, Morganti 2015, Tahko 2014, and the papers in Bliss & Priest 
2018). Note also the connection between this topic and the formal features of ground: if 
instances of ground can be, for example, symmetrical, then this removes an obvious objection 
to non-well-founded grounding chains. 
The well-foundedness of grounding chains is also closely related to two other issues. 
The first is that of fundamentality (or foundationalism – though on the difference between 
these notions see, e.g., Raven 2016). It is often assumed that the grounds of a fact are 
metaphysically prior to or more fundamental than the grounded fact. Thus, ground seems to 
provide a way to understand relative fundamentality, at least between facts which stand in 
grounding relations to each other. And it is tempting to think that facts which are ungrounded 
are absolutely fundamental; they are such that no facts are more fundamental. Furthermore, 
                                                 
3 Ground is typically also taken to be monotonic and factive, but these features are rarely 
challenged. 
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one might think that the ungrounded facts serve as a complete minimal basis for all the facts 
they ground. Whether these notions of fundamentality can be defined in terms of ground, and 
how they relate to other notions of fundamentality, are discussed by Karen Bennett (2017) 
and Tuomas Tahko (2018). 
The second issue is the question of what, if anything, grounds the grounding facts: 
that is, what explains the fact that a certain fact, [f], is grounded in facts [g1], [g2], etc? This 
has been presented as a potentially devastating problem for grounding, because it threatens to 
erase the difference between more and less fundamental facts (Sider 2011). Responses which 
have been offered include: (a) the grounds, i.e., [g1], [g2], etc., themselves ground the fact 
that they ground [f] (Bennett 2011; deRosset 2013); (b) the fact that [f] is grounded in facts 
[g1], [g2], etc. is itself grounded in essential facts concerning the nature of [f] or its grounds, 
or perhaps their constituents (Rosen 2010; Fine 2012); (c) the fact that [f] is grounded in facts 
[g1], [g2], etc. is not itself apt to be grounded – rather, it is autonomous (Dasgupta 2014). 
As mentioned earlier, work on the relations between ground and essence has 
flourished. Another lively set of discussions concerns the relations between ground and 
metaphysical modality (specifically necessity). For instance, it is widely assumed that the full 
grounds of a fact metaphysically necessitate that the grounded fact obtains;4 this view has 
been termed necessitarianism. Necessitarianism has come under fire (Leuenberger 2014a; 
Skiles 2015), as has the related thesis that grounded facts supervene on their grounds 
(Leuenberger 2014b). More generally, the question of how ground relates to ontological 
dependence remains a live issue. Early discussions of ground tended to run these notions 
together (Schaffer 2009; Rosen 2010). More recently a range of options for relating these 
notions has been considered by Benjamin Schnieder (forthcoming; see also Raven 2016). 
                                                 
4 On the distinction between full and partial grounds see Fine 2012, 50.  
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The range of applications of ground is far too broad to adequately cover here. A very 
brief summary would include formulating physicalism (Block 2015; Ney 2016; Schaffer 
2017; Ó Conaill 2018; Wilson 2018); formulating and accounting for the causal closure of the 
physical (Tiehen 2015; Kroedel & Schultz 2016); and formulating and discussing various 
positions in metaethics (Väyrynen 2013; Bader 2017; Toppinen 2018; Leary forthcoming). 
 
3. The papers in this special issue 
The special issue opens with half a dozen papers on ground, its relation to other notions, and 
its applications. In these papers we will see that there is also a need to reconsider the notions 
of ontological dependence, essence, and modality. The half a dozen papers in the second half 
of the special issue deal precisely with these topics. In what follows we shall briefly outline 
the main theses of each paper. 
 Henrik Rydéhnʼs paper Grounding and Ontological Dependence explores how 
different notions of ontological dependence and ground relate to each other. He begins with 
the assumption that ground is factive: if [f] is grounded in [g], then [f] and [g] both exist. He 
argues that on this conception, ground neither requires nor necessitates any form of rigid 
ontological dependence (where the grounded fact cannot obtain unless the specific facts 
which ground it obtain). Nor is rigid dependence necessary for non-factive grounding; but at 
least one version of rigid dependence (Loweʼs explanatory existential dependence) is 
sufficient for non-factive grounding. Rydéhn then considers generic ontological dependence 
(where the grounded fact cannot obtain unless some fact or facts of a certain type obtain). He 
argues that given the Principle of Metaphysical Insufficiency (roughly, if [f] is factively 
grounded at some possible world, it is factively grounded at every world in which it obtains), 
then generic dependence is necessary (but insufficient) for both factive and non-factive 
grounding.  
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 In The Ground of Ground, Essence, and Explanation, Michael Wallner deals with one 
of the most pressing questions for a theory of ground, namely, the problem of what grounds 
the grounding facts, as discussed in section 2 above. Wallner surveys some of the answers 
that have been offered so far, by Bennett, deRosset, and Litland. The main claim of his paper 
is that if grounding is to be regarded as a type of metaphysical explanation (as opposed to just 
something that backs metaphysical explanation), then Grounding Essentialism is the most 
promising strategy. This type of strategy suggests that the grounding facts are grounded in the 
essences of either the grounds or the grounded facts. Such a strategy has been outlined in 
previous work by Rosen (2010), Fine (2012), and Dasgupta (2014), but Wallner goes on to 
develop a more systematic approach on these lines and connects the issue to other areas of 
interest for the grounding theorist. 
 In the previous section we mentioned that ground may be one way to understand the 
relative fundamentality of facts, i.e., one factʼs being more fundamental than another. In The 
Logic of Relative Fundamentality, Fabrice Correia objects to any such account. Having 
outlined a detailed logic of relative fundamentality, he then explores the Reductive View on 
which for a fact to be grounded can be analysed in terms of relative fundamentality. 
Specifically, Correia shows how the proposed logic of relative fundamentality allows us to 
derive important principles which feature in different logical schemes for ground. 
 Another topic mentioned in the previous section was whether or not grounding chains 
must be well-founded. Michele Lubrano, in his paper The Emergence of Ground: Some 
Limitative Results tackles this issue. He discusses a recent argument that grounding chains 
need not be well-founded, provided by Matteo Morganti (2015), who argues that in an 
infinitely long grounding chain the obtaining of a grounded fact is not something passed up to 
this fact from its immediate grounds (the transmission model), but comes from the infinite 
chain of grounds as a whole (the emergence model). Morganti defends this claim by adopting 
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an argument originally developed by Jeanna Peijnenburg and David Atkinson in defence of 
epistemological infinitism (2013). Lubrano argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinsonʼs argument 
cannot be applied successfully to some prominent versions of ground. 
 Samuele Chiloviʼs paper Grounding Entails Supervenience addresses a number of 
arguments advanced by Stephan Leuenberger (2014b) against the suggestion that grounded 
facts supervene on their grounds (or on facts of the type to which their grounds belong). 
Chiloviʼs strategy is to accept Leuenbergerʼs arguments against four different principles 
linking grounding and supervenience, but by working through these arguments to arrive at a 
further principle which does not succumb to any of Leuenbergerʼs objections. Specifically, 
Chilovi argues that a grounded fact must supervene on a certain plurality of types of fact. In 
this way, he suggests, we can capture how grounded facts are modally sensitive to the types 
of facts to which their actual grounds belong. 
 Benjamin Schnieder’s On Ground and Consequence is an example of the notion of 
ground being used to supplement a modal understanding of some concept, in this case the 
concept of logical consequence. Schnieder argues that the modal understanding of logical 
consequence generates counterexamples and fails to locate the source of the truth of the 
consequent. He then outlines an account of logical consequence in terms of ground, and 
compares his account to different relevance logics. 
 Barbara Vetter defends dispositionalism about modality against a criticism by David 
Yates (2015) that it cannot capture certain formal conditions on any account of modality. The 
worry is that dispositions, as usually understood, can only bring about certain contingent 
events or states; on this view there is no disposition to bring it about that 2 + 2 = 4. In A 
Plenitude of Powers, Vetter responds by arguing that there are such dispositions. She defends 
the view that positing dispositions for necessary truths or states is not ad hoc, by arguing that 
they can be understood as combinations of other features which have been ascribed to 
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dispositions (e.g., that certain dispositions are necessarily always manifested, or that they can 
manifest without partners or stimulus conditions). She also argues that these dispositions will 
be borne by specific objects, e.g., whatever is the truthmaker for the truth that 2 + 2 = 4. 
 In Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality, Antonella Mallozzi tackles an important 
issue in modal epistemology: the issue of whether there is just one modal space or modal 
primitive (modal monism) or whether metaphysical modality and conceptual modality are 
genuinely distinct. Mallozzi draws a contrast between David Chalmersʼs project, which 
operates within the realm of modal monism and employs two-dimensional modal semantics 
to account for a posteriori necessities, and the traditional Kripkean approach, whereby the 
underlying ground of metaphysical necessities lies in the essences of things. Mallozzi 
identifies an inconsistent triad between three theses (modal monism, two-dimensionalism, 
and metaphysical Kripkeanism), and argues that, ultimately, Chalmersʼs conceivability-based 
strategy is probably going to be unsatisfactory from the Kripkean perspective, since by 
starting from a conceptual-cum-epistemic approach, the conceivability-based strategy fails to 
do justice to the modal metaphysics that underlies metaphysical Kripkeanism. 
 In The Difference Between Epistemic and Metaphysical Necessity, Martin Glazier 
engages in further examination of the modal space and the important distinction between 
alethic, objective, or genuine necessities, such as metaphysical and natural necessity, and 
subjective necessities such as epistemic or deontic necessity. However, distinguishing 
between these types of necessity, important though it is, is quite difficult. Glazier attempts to 
give an account of genuine necessity in explanatory terms. He first rules out various 
unsatisfactory accounts for dealing with genuine necessity, before developing his own 
approach. Glazier’s paper ties the themes of this volume together in an interesting manner, as 
he discusses whether the relevant type of explanation at hand here could be grounding 
explanation, even though he ultimately rejects this idea. Instead, he argues that to be 
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genuinely necessary is just to impose constraints on the world which have explanatory power 
– this amounts to what Glazier calls necessitarian explanation. 
 Penelope Mackie considers the issue of de re modal claims, particularly those 
concerning the persistence conditions of objects. For instance, a statue is widely thought to 
have different persistence conditions to the lump of material from which it is formed. 
Contingent identity theorists argue that despite this, the statue is identical with the lump. 
They seek to accommodate the difference in persistence conditions by claiming that modal 
predicates are ʻAbelardianʼ: they can stand for different properties depending on the context, 
e.g., on the subject term to which they are attached. In Persistence and Modality, Mackie 
argues against this construal of modal predicates; specifically, she claims that if de re modal 
predications are understood in this way, they can be satisfied too easily, which defeats the 
purpose of making de re as opposed to de dicto modal predications.  
 Mark Jagoʼs Essential Bundle Theory and Modality also considers contingent identity, 
but in a more sympathetic manner. Bundle theories identify concrete objects with bundles of 
properties, but in so doing they face problems accommodating the contingent properties of 
concrete objects. Jago proposes essential bundle theory, which identifies concrete objects 
with bundles of essential properties. This proposal faces a variant of the problem of 
contingent properties: it seems that on this proposal, each concrete object is necessarily 
located wherever it exists in time and space. Jago argues that this problem can be met by 
adopting an essential property version of counterpart theory, on which the counterpart 
relation is the same-essence relation. This version of counterpart theory allows for contingent 
identity, and so allows for each concrete object to possibly have existed elsewhere in space 
and time (because it could have been identical with some other bundle of essential properties 
than the bundle with which it is actually identical). 
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 In Taking Leave of Our Essences, Nathan Wildman examines the very widely 
accepted Finean idea that metaphysical modality reduces to essence. Wildman questions this 
common idea by way of introducing four puzzles that pose difficult challenges for those who 
wish to reduce metaphysical modality to essence. The first puzzle suggests that there are 
cases where some proposition is true in virtue of the essence of some entities, but where that 
proposition is not in fact metaphysically necessary. The second puzzle concerns essences that 
themselves feature modal truths (loaded essences), such as potentialities contained within an 
essence. The third puzzle, the Isolation puzzle, examines the intuitive idea that possibilities 
involving only the intrinsic properties of an entity should only be sensitive to the essence of 
the entity itself and the essences of the relevant intrinsic properties. Finally, the fourth puzzle, 
named after Columbo, suggests that there is a tension regarding the independently plausible 
claims that there is a universal plurality, a collective essence of that plurality (collective 
essence of absolutely everything), and the principle that some entity possibly exists if and 
only if the entity’s existence is not excluded by the collective essence of the universal 
plurality. In each of these four cases, Wildman anticipates some trouble for the essentialist. 
He concludes by briefly considering where these puzzles leave us with regard to the 
relationship between essence and modality. 
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